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Abstract
This paper is concerned with two things: finding an objective and
easily quantifiable measure of government efficiency and testing possi-
ble determinants of such quality. As measures of government efficiency
we use the ratios of infant mortality rate to health expenditures as a
percentage of GDP and the ratios of drop out and illiteracy rates to
education expenditures as a percentage of GDP. We assume that gov-
ernment efficiency in providing health and education services depends
on economic, political and cultural factors.
JEL: A, C1, O43




Now a days there is a consensus that efficient governments can make a dif-
ference to a country’s economic performance. The high quality of the public
institutions (and more generally of governments) is viewed as necessary to
assure that policies have a positive and lasting effect on income[1]. Taking for
granted the importance of good government other questions naturally arise:
how can government efficiency be measured? Why do some countries have
better government than others? If we can trace the determinants of govern-
ment efficiency, hoe can we manipulate them to boost quality and enhance
growth? In other words can policy choices affect the quality of government?
Before beginning to answer these questions it is essential to define what
government quality is. In [2], good government stands for ”good-for-capitalistic
development”. In this paper we use the term good government to stand for
a government that provides services, in essential sectors like health and edu-
cation, in an efficient way, i.e., where the relation between output indicators
and the amount of resources necessary to achieve it is high. Health and
education are two of the most important sectors of government provision [4].
We will test as determinants of quality several variables similar to the ones
used in [2]. In the paper those determinants are grouped in three categories:
Economic1, Political2 and Cultural3. We will have a more extensive reading
of each of these groups and hence include more variable in our study.
This paper intends to contribute to the literature by providing new and
quantifiable measures of government efficiency as well as understanding the
1In this category the main idea is that institutions are created whenever the benefits
of their existence are greater than the costs os their creation. Wealth and development
would make this trade-off between benefits and costs in favor of good governance, not only
because development would make good institutions affordable but also because it would
make them more reliable.
2In this second category, the basic assumption is that those in power will shape policies
and institutions to allow them to remain in power and transfer resources toward them-
selves. Some groups and some societies allow rent seeking behavior in a more generalized
way than others.
3The third group of determinants relies on the fact that societies have beliefs that
induce collective actions and make certain kind of behaviors more probable. When these
beliefs are strongly persistent they tend to be associated with culture. Religion can be
seen as a proxy of cultural characteristics since it strongly influences the individual and
social actions.
2
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Figure 1:
determinants of their variability across countries.
2 Data
2.1 Definitions and Sources
The analysis presented in this paper uses a set of variables covering up to
208 countries. The definition and sources of all the variables are summarized
in Appendix A. We used a data set with five year averages (1970 to 1974;
1975 to 1980, etc.).4
2.2 Dependent Variables
We selected the following measures of government performance:
public health expenditures as a % GDP public education expenditures as
a % GDP public education expenditures as a % GDP
We difined the indicatores in this maner so that the reading is consistent:
if the numerator increases the ratio decreases and we are worse of. If the
denominator increases (for the same numerator, i.e., for the same infant
morality ratio, for exemple) the measure decreases and, in fact, we are also
worse of.
4In most cases there were data missing in between 1970 and 200. We used the maximum
number of observations available leading to averages with different number of years. The
summary statistics for each variable are presented in appendix B.
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2.3 Independent Variables
We consider the three mentioned groups of government quality determinants
- economic, political and cultural. For each of these groups we selected
variables that, according to the existing literature, are viewed as proxies. We
were left with the following variables:
Table 1
Economic Political Cultural
GDP per capita Corruption Index Religious Fractionalization Index
Percentage of Urban Population Political Freedom Index Country's Main Religious Confession
Age Stucture of Population Bureaucracy Index Country's Legal System
Sectorial Strucutre of Employment Law and Order Index
Trade Ethnic Fractionalization Index
Foreign Direct Investment Gini index
Government Expenditures
GDP per capita stands for a country’s wealth while the urban popultion,
the age srtucture or the employment structure are used as proxys of the
develpoment level. Government expenditures are used to try and infer if
there is, in fact, a relation between size and quality. The other two variables
in this group account for the degree of opness.
To evaluate the relevance of political factors in determining government
quality, we use indexes of corruption, political freedom, quality of the bu-
reaucracy and law and order tradition5. As proxies of the level of social
polarization and fractionalization we will use an index of ethnic fractional-
ization and the gini index to account for inequalities in income distribution.
The proxies of cultural factors are an index of religious fractionalization,
dummy variables that account for the legal system (namely English, French,
German, Scandinavian and Socialist) and still a dummy for each of the main
religious confessions (Catholic, Protestant and Muslim).6
2.4 Regression Results
5We acttualy drop the corruption and the bureaucracy index due to the high correlation
with the law and order index.
6The correlations between all the variables can be seen in appendix D.
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We started by checking what our intuition, supported by the related litera-
ture, was telling us: wealth has a predominant effect on government perfor-
mance.
Wealthier countries should have not only the means to provide better
public services but also a greater demand for them. The Positive sign on the
estimate associated with loggdppc (table 2) confirms this thesis.
Our second concern had to do with government size. Our question was: if
a wealthier nation has better performing governments than shouldn’t wealth-
ier governments (or at least governments that spend more) be more efficient?
In table 2 we can see that general expenditures are determinant to govern-
ment performance. Not only they are significant at 1% but they do not
weaken the importance of loggdppc. The results tell us that the higher the
general expenditures are the more efficient a government should be. In the
related literature the relation between government size and quality is am-
biguous however our data points to a clear positive relation between them.
We then proceed to see if variables from the other groups (political and
cultural) had any relevance in explaining differences in government perfor-
mance around the world.
Following the literature, we expect that an increase in the number of
different groups within a society or an excessive social polarization (wether
we are talking about income groups or ethnic ones) will foster inefficiency. 7
Both the loggdppc and ge survive the introduction of the gini index and of
the ethnic fractionalization index. However the results concerning both this
indexes are not consistent (table 3).Ethnic fractionalization is statistically
relevant and has a negative effect on mrihepu (which means that an increase
7In [16] the authors state that: ”We find trust and civic norms are strong in nations
with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain predatory actions of
chief executives, and with better-educated and ethnically homogenous populations”. So,
equal incomes and ethnically homogeneous populations built up a trustful society that in
turn enhances governance quality
The link between trust and homogeneity is also referred in [18]: ”Trust is higher in
more ethnically, socially and economically homogeneous societies and where legal and
social mechanisms for constraining opportunism are better developed”.
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in the ethnic fractionalization leads to a decrease in government performance
in the health department)
The second type of political variables has to do with distortions to the
normal functioning of political institutions. Distortions to the normal func-
tioning of political institutions should have a negative effect on government
quality. If a well functioning government offers the ”correct” amount of a
given service using the proper amount of inputs, any interference in this
relation will cause inefficiencies and hence lead to worse governing. These
distortions have a negative impact on public spending in general and on pub-
lic spending in particular8. This negative impact doesn’t necessarily mean
that there will be less public spending or investment, it can also mean that
this investment will be less productive9. More commonly corruption and
excessive bureaucracy will lead to less investment (public or private) and
to the channeling of investment towards the interests of certain groups [26].
The relation between public and private sectors will also be damaged by the
prevalence of distortions in the political process [25]. The absence of political
or civic liberties themselves can also damage government efficiency10.
Because the correlation between the indicators (political freedom, corrup-
tion, bureaucracy and law and order) were so high we decided to use only
two. In particular we chose the ones that had more data available. In table 4
we can see that the introduction of lo or pr does not interfere with the results
concerning neither loggdppc nor ge. Both indexes have estimates with the
expected sign. An increase in lo means an increase in law and order tradition
which in turn leads to an increase in government performance. However this
index is only statistically relevant in the first regression. An increase in pr
means less political rights which in turn leads to less efficient governments.
This index is relevant in two of the regressions presented.
Cultural traditions that favor trust and confidence, that protect the in-
8As mentioned in [28]
9See [29]
10As noted by the authors of [30]: ”Democracy may also influence the ”quality of gover-
nance”: rulers with discretionary power tend to set up distortionary policies that benefit
a small set of insiders at the expense of the general population (...). The exercise of power
is potentially more arbitrary in autocratic regimes that lack public scrutiny of policy mak-
ers”.
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dividual against the state and that limit the power of the governors11 should
improve government quality. According to [19] there is a negative association
between trust and the dominance of a strong religion. Hence, religious frac-
tionalization may lead to higher government quality if societies are able to
overcome differences. A related issue as to do with the influence of a countries
main confession in its government efficiency. Following [2] it is expected that
Protestant countries have more efficient countries than Catholic or Muslim
ones. The same argument is made in [11]. The results presented in table 5
allow us to conclude that religious fractionalization has, in fact, a positive
effect on government efficiency. The case is more clear in the education sec-
tor. Now broadly speaking religious dummies seem to have no relevance in
determining government performance (there are few but inconsistent excep-
tions).
We also tried a country´s legal system as possible determinant of govern-
ment efficiency (see [2]). We left out the English legal system and our results
(table 6) are not conclusive.
In table 7 we can see the results concerning what we previously called
social-economic variables.
We can see that in the cases where urban population is statistically rele-
vant it has a positive effect on government efficiency. This means that rater
than being a proxy for the level of underdevelopment, urban concentration
makes it easier to provide good quality services.
The age structure of the population does not have a consistent effect on
efficiency.
The employment structure tells us one interesting thing: the more agri-
cultural oriented a society is the less efficient its governments will be. This
can be explained on one hand considering that a concentration of employ-
ment in the agricultural sector means less development or, on the other, that
it means less urban concentrations. The results concerning the percentage of
employment in services has a rater strange result (when significant): it is not
good for government efficiency to have high concentration of employment in
the services sector. This might have to do with some increasing bureaucracy
that emerges when we have to many people providing services.
11[2]
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Once again it should be emphasized that the introduction of these vari-
ables does not change the effect of loggdppc nor ge in government efficiency.
Al last in table 8 we can see the results concerning the degree of expo-
sure to the exterior. The gross foreign direct investment has no particular
relevance in explaining government efficiency however trade seems to have a
positive effect on the indexes considered.
3 Conclusion
We used three different groups of possible determinants of Government Qual-
ity.
This groups followed very closely the literature being: economic determi-
nants; political determinants and cultural determinants.
The second group has a somewhat different reading than the one found
in paper [2]and that is due mainly to the way Quality is measured in the
referred paper.
We conclude that the most consistent and robust determinants of gov-
ernment efficiency are:
Wealth - Richer countries have on average more efficient governments
if income is distributed in an evenly fashion
Government Expenditures - The larger the amount spent by general
governments the more efficient they will be. In [2] the authors conclude that
better performing governments are also larger ones but do not conclude to
the direction of this relation.
Notice that both this variables survived the test for endogenity. Broadly
speaking we found evidence that the existence of several groups in a soci-
ety had some bearing in government performance but the results were not
consistent with the variables used (sometimes income groups was the rele-
vant factor others what matter was ethnic groups). Political rights or law
and order tradition (one of the two) affects in a positive way government
performance.
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Cultural factors seem to have some importance mainly if we are talking
religious fractionalization. In what dominant religion is concerned the conclu-
sions were not consistent. The legal system tradition seems to be irrelevant
in determining the variability in government decision around the world.
Urban population seems to have a positive contribution to government
quality and the percentage of agricultural employment a negative impact.
We can conclude that all the three groups have some influence in explain-
ing the variability we observe in government efficiency across countries. At
least one variable of each group was relevant in determining changes in the
quality indexes we constructed.
We believe that there is a considerable variability of Government qual-
ity around the world and that this variability is determined by differences
in a country’s economic, political and cultural factors. The new measures
of government efficiency presented are objective and easily quantifiable and
capture a different reality form the measures used so far (mainly qualitative
measures). In the present economic and social scenario, we have developed
countries with limited budgets and extremely vulnerable to economic cycles.
It is harder to come up with more inflows and government expenditures are
difficult to restrain. We have governments that cannot expand and that have
an urgent need in gaining efficiency. Knowing what’s behind such efficiency
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Appendix A . Defenitions and Sources
Name Description Soruce
Bureau Index - quality of bureaucracy Freedom House 2003
c Dummy - 1 majority population catholic [23]
Corr Index - corruption Freedom House 2003
Dor drop out rate [10]
ea employment agriculture - % total employment WDI 2000
ei employment industry - % total employment WDI 2000
es employment services - % total employment WDI 2000
fracethnic Index - ethnic fractionalization [2]
fraclang Index - linguistic fractionalization [2]
fracreg Index - religious fractionalization [2]
gdppc gdp constant prices 1995 US$, per capita WDI 2000
ge central government general expenditures, % gdp WDI 2000
gfdi gross foreign direct investment, % gdp WDI 2000
Hepu public health expenditures, % gdp WDI 2000
ir iliteracy rate, adult (above 15) WDI 2000
lat latitude WDI 2000
lo Index - law and order Freedom House 2003
lse Legal system, english [23]
lsf Legal system, french [23]
lsg Legal system, german [23]
lss legal system, socialist [23]
lssc Legal system, scandinavian [23]
m Dummy - 1 majority population muslim [23]
majorit Dummy - 1 Majoritarian electoral rule [30]
mri mortality rate infant WDI 2000
p Dummy - 1 majority population protestant [23]
pop0 population ages 0-14, % total population WDI 2000
pop15 population ages 15-64, % total population WDI 2000
pop65 population ages 65 and more, % total population WDI 2000
pr Index - political rights Freedom House 2003
pres Dummy - 1 Political regime presidential [30]
pse public spending on education %gdp WDI 2000
t trade %gdp WDI 2000
urban urban population, % total population WDI 2000
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Appendix B . Summary Statistics
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Appendix C . Regression Results
Table 212
n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2
560 11,1 418 28.22 459 22.13 380 28.56 328 42.53 231 47.01
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant -0.5594 52.50268 63.49847 62.33876 -41.66377 -31.58269
loggdppc 1.84c 11.48625 7.69a 4.46577 10.91a 3.61903 8.29a 3.016412 13.22a 15.23214 9.60a 12.46254








n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2
217 42.23 413 28.57 220 33.51 380 28.67 149 43.8 227 49.78
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 39.39147 54.63328 46.74347 60.59047 44.87723 -4.773118
loggdppc 6.75a 5.298376 6.26a 4.33269 4.07a 3.979868 5.87a 3.145886 4.86a 5.950746 8.55a 10.84002
ge 3.85a 0.2400634 4.60a 0.1743101 3.61a 0.2698968 4.79a 0.213122 2.54b 0.2592471 2.91b 0.2977736
gini 1.90c 0.1515699 0.89 0.1307371 -2.43b -0.354867
fracethn -0.82 -2.496764 0.49 1.724462 -4.15a -26.39742
mrihepu
Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2
irpse dorpse
Table 4
n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2
405 30.32 262 36.28 374 28.44 215 33.7 222 47.3 190 48.26
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 58.35382 62.13669 64.87332 59.5502 6.98a -16.52437 -28.63463
loggdppc 6.48a 4.030884 6.00a 2.812565 5.64a 2.785337 4.29a 3.078843 3.34a 11.20125 6.71a 11.85463
ge 4.80a 0.1795827 3.92a 0.1197742 4.97a 0.214123 4.31a 0.1787851 -1.83c 0.4172686 2.51b 0.3622814
pr -3.57a -0.868185 -0.75 -0.220816 -13486158
lo 3.36a 1.673571 1.01 0.6335618 0.29 0.470484
Regression1 Regression2
irpse dorpse mrihepu
Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2
Table 5
n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2
415 29.13 418 35.73 380 28.95 380 31.91 229 47.71 231 47.1
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 49.76577 54.44565 61.03994 64.02884 -32.09113 -31.76453
loggdppc 7.60a 4.591771 8.11a 4.257471 8.34a 3.042734 9.36a 3.188353 9.58a 12.52454 9.27a 12.41031
ge 4.69a 0.1661647 5.73a 0.2162923 4.97a 0.2068389 4.40a 0.1926522 2.94a 0.3945207 3.09a 0.4088214
fracreg 2.33b 5.043556 1.77c 2.987444 0.11 0.688182
c 0.8 0.8433611 -4.58a -4.996401 0.48 1.750046
m 0.92 1.246345 -0.7 -0.67033 -0.19 -0.631193
p -4.82a -7.829834 -1.23 -2.294294 0.02 0.1163624
irpse dorpse mrihepu
Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2
Table 6
12a - significant at 1%; b - significant at 5%; c - significant at 10%
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n R2 n R2 n R2
418 30.8 380 29.62 231 57.35
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 52.71379 63.78866 -49.61415
loggdppc 7.92a 4.37725 7.24a 3.03924 10.04a 14.9043
ge 4.13a 0.1640009 4.50a 0.2062664 2.19b 0.2678176
lss 6.15a 7.587531 0.28 0.7395012 6.32a 24.0608
lsf 0.23 0.2959931 -2.12b -2.482199 -0.24 -0.857057
lsg 3.37a 4.905761 -0.3 -0.33738 -3.04a -11.7022





n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2 n R2
418 29.62 418 28.98 380 28.79 375 28.94 231 48.44 223 52.334
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 59.62523 53.58429 60.23254 66.34551 -21.4168 81.55463
loggdppc 3.46a 2.783349 4.82a 4.02854 7.51a 3.549473 4.71a 3.329085 5.39a 9.20704 5.45a 8.41625
ge 4.63a 0.177197 4.42a 0.1625907 4.95a 0.2135738 4.66a 0.2193035 3.02a 0.4509967 4.09a 0.6765661
Urban 2.87b 0.1105326 -1.34 -0.046513 2.91a 0.2545386
pop0 0.09 0.0129486 -0.89 -0.113009 -5.84a -2.05931
pop65 1.29 0.407374 1.6 -0.42668 -4.41a -3.272017
n R2 n R2 n R2
221 40.17 191 55.92 194 55.93
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 85.97054 77.88328 89.81988








ea -2.61a -2.054264 -2.46a -0.143205 -6.51a -1.03972






Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2 Regression1 Regression2
Regression3Regression3 Regression3
Table 8
n R2 n R2 n R2
tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff. tobs Coeff.
Constant 53.26944 59.97203 -44.13384
loggdppc 10.91a 4.493673 7.84a 3.109494 9.41a 13.26506
ge 3.36a 0.1220216 4.50a 0.1860698 1.57 0.2436902
t 1.15 0.009575 2.79a 0.0271512 2.71a 0.1375234




Appendix D . Correlations
pr Corr lo Bureau SIRPSE SDORPSE SMRIHEP
pr 1
Corr -0.52 1
lo -0.49 0.7 1
Bureau -0.53 0.76 0.66 1
irpse -0.347515 -0.026098 -0.006285 -0.067858 1
dorpse -0.029184 -0.109149 0.0846609 0.0099926 0.6350399 1
mrihepu -0.251249 0.2521941 0.3980894 0.3984514 0.3726411 0.2615015 1
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